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FICTITIOUS PRICING AND THE FTC:
A NEW LOOK AT AN OLD DODGE
CARLETON A. ){ARKRADER f
Everyone loves, and hopes to find, bargains. It is this
universal human trait that is exploited by the practice
of fictitious pricing, whatever its form.
Rayex Corp., No. 7346,
FTC, April 2, 1962.
There's a sucker born every minute.
-- Phiveas Taylor Barnum
THE consumer's understandable desire to buy at a bar-
gain price prompts him to spend money he might other-
wise save or spend for something else. It is the vendor's
long-time goal to convert this all-too-human trait into the
sale of his goods. Yet theoretically, the market price in a
competitive economy is set by supply and demand to afford
an optimum return to the manufacturer and others in the
distribution system for their efforts and capital. Inducing
further sales by lowering prices below this point means a
loss for some along the line. To solve this dilemma, sellers
t A.B., Virginia Military Institute, LL.B., Yale University; partner, Wald,Harkrader & Rockefeller, Washington, D. C. The author acknowledges the
invaluable assistance of his colleague, Phillip D. Bostwick, and the fore-
bearance of his partners, Robert L. Wald and Edwin S. Rockefeller, during
preparation of this article.
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over the years have hit upon the device of creating illusory
bargains in the minds of purchasers, thus playing upon the
purchasers' cupidity without sacrificing profits. The infinite
variety of techniques for accomplishing this paradox is a
tribute, if not to the "morals of the market place," ' at
least to the inventive genius of businessmen. Such schemes
have given rise to a new economic and legal concept:
fictitious pricing.2
The Federal Trade Commission, throughout its nearly
half-century of existence, has condemned many different
methods of "fictitious" pricing as injurious to competition or
misleading to consumers.3  Most have involved retailers,4 but
I Cardozo, J. in Meinhard v. Salmon, 249 N.Y. 458, 464, 164 N.E. 545,
546 (1928).
2 "Fictitious" prices may result not only from businessmen's efforts to
mislead bargain hunters, but may be implied even where the manufacturer or
retailer acts in good faith, but objective circumstances result in some unin-
tended "fiction." In FTC matters it is ordinarily immaterial whether the
respondent knows his representation is false. Gimbel Bros. v. FTC, 116 F.2d
578 (2d Cir. 1941). But see Regina Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 15936,
at 20745 (FTC June 13, 1962).
3 The FTC was created in 1914 by the Federal Trade Commission Act,
38 Stat. 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1958). Whereas the Sherman Act,
26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended, 15 U.S.C. 5 1 (1958), had been passed in an
effort to maintain competition by prohibiting the ends that eliminate it (monop-
oly and monopolistic practices) and the means by which these are achieved
(contracts, combinations and conspiracies in restraint of trade), the FTC Act
was passed to regidate competition by insuring that competitive practices meet
a certain acceptable standard. Section 5 declared that "unfair methods of
competition in commerce" were unlawful, and was later amplified by the
Wheeler-Lea Amendment, 52 Stat. 111 (1938), 15 U.S.C. g 45 (1958), to
include "unfair or deceptive acts or practices." This language was added to
nullify the effect of the Supreme Court's holding in FTC v. Raladam Co.,
283 U.S. 643 (1931), requiring proof of injury to competition under section 5;
it became necessary to show only substantially injurious effects upon the con-
suming public. See generally Moore, Deceptive Trade Practices and the
Federal Trade Commission, 28 TENN. L. Rv. 493 (1961) ;note, 36 ST. JoiN'S
L. REv. 274 (1962). The FTC has the power to curb acts in their incipiency
which, if full blown, would constitute violations of the Sherman Act, but
which cannot yet be proceeded against by the Department of Justice. FTC v.
Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683 (1948). (For a discussion of the division
of functions in antitrust enforcement see Rockefeller, Antitrust Enforcement:
Duopoly or Monopoly?, 1962 Wis. L. REv. 437.) Fictitious pricing may
violate Section 5 of the FTC Act as an unfair method of competition, as
deceptive of consumers, or both. If fur products are fictitiously priced, there
is also a violation of the Fur Products Labeling Act, 65 Stat. 175 (1951),
15 U.S.C. § 69 (1958). Mandel Bros. v. FTC, 254 F.2d 18 (7th Cir. 1958),
rev'd on other grounds, 359 U.S. 385 (1959) ; De Gorter v. FTC, 244 F.2d 270
(9th Cir. 1957); The Fair v. FTC, 272 F.2d 609 (7th Cir. 1959).
4 See, e.g., Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 883 (1960).
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several have attacked manufacturers.' The nub of the
retailer cases, despite shifting phraseology used by different
respondents, has been the actual or implied comparison of
two prices: a fictitious higher or "usual" price and a lower
or "reduced" actual selling price." The core of the man-
ufacturer cases has been the promulgation of a "normal"
retail value for the product through methods such as retail
price lists, price tags or marks on the product, which is in
fact greater than the price at which the product usually
sells.7  An impressive volume of precedent in both lines
of cases had evolved by 1958, when the Commission pro-
mulgated its Guides Against Deceptive Pricing.8 But since
that time there have been several important new decisions
not anticipated in the Guides. The implications and over-
tones of these cases pose significant pricing problems for
those engaged in the manufacture and distribution of con-
sumer goods.
BACKGROUND
The Revolution in Retailing
Since 1920, when the FTC first held that a piano
manufacturer had violated Section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act by stencilling his instruments with prices
"grossly in excess of the prices at which such pianos .. .
are usually sold at retail,"' an increasing number of
Commission cases have dealt with the problem of fictitious
pricing. Today it is the leading type of deception practiced
5 See, e.g., Clinton Watch Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 952 (1962).6 E.g., "The use by the respondents in this case [electrical appliance re-
tailers] of manufacturers' suggested list prices and other higher prices in com-
parison with lower advertised sales prices were misrepresentations as to usual
and customary prices and as to savings afforded purchasers . . . ." George's
Radio & Television Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 15691, at 20526 (FTC Jan.
19, 1962).
7 This theory stems from language of Mr. Justice Brandeis in FTC v.
Winsted Hosiery Co., 258 U.S. 483, 494 (1922) : "That a person is a wrong-
doer who so furnishes another with the means of consummating a fraud has
long been a part of the law of unfair competition."
8 Guides Against Deceptive Pricing, FTC, 23 Fed. Reg. 7965 (1958),
2 CCH TRADE RE. RaP. 1 7835.48 (1961).
9 Holland Piano Mfg. Co., 3 F.T.C. 31 (1920).
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in violation of the FTC Act.' ° The upswing in cases can
be traced to one paramount factor - the "Revolution in
Retailing" of the 1950's."
From the turn of the century until after World War
II, retail trade revolved around the downtown department
stores. These stores were generally operated on a large
(usually forty percent) retail markup over cost, whether
on a handkerchief or a refrigerator. Stores were designed
to provide the shopper with a large selection of mer-
chandise, each item available at two or three different qual-
ities, brands or prices. Regular customer services included
floor clerks, wrapping, packaging, delivery, credit terms and
acceptance of returned goods. During this period the
manufacturers' suggested retail prices simply reflected the
prevailing forty percent markup, hence were clearly not
fictitious.
The post-World War II climate, however, produced
a new brand of merchandiser: the low-markup, high-
volume, quick-turnover discount retailer who dispensed with
expensive frills associated with the traditional department
store. 2 The birth of the discount house brought a wave
of unprecedented competition in selling in an industry
already vigorously competitive. "Discounters" cut the re-
tailers' traditional forty percent markup in half, com-
pensating for loss of revenue by holding operating ex-
penses to a minimum. Stores were opened in buildings
that were often little more than warehouses, located in
the suburbs to take advantage of low rentals and the
population migration; employees reduced by self-service tech-
niques; usual customer services ruthlessly eliminated. Be-
cause their lower prices meant cold cash savings to con-
sumers when compared with competitive department store
Mo In a typical recent year, over thirty per cent of the FTC's cease and
desist orders dealt with fictitious pricing. U.S. FTC Press Release, Aug.
22, 1958.
11 See generally Silberman, The Revolutionists of Retailing, Fortune, April
1962, p. 99.
12For a discussion about Eugene Ferkauf, originator of the first discount
house, New York's E. J. Korvette, Inc., see Retailing: Everybody Loves a
Barga'n, Time, July 6, 1962, p. 57.
[ VOL. 37
FICTITIOUS PRICING AND THE FTC
prices, and the discount houses specialized in flamboyant
advertising of this fact, they flourished.
In many cases aggressive discount house competition
brought about the demise or "modification" of department
stores. Some failed altogether; others fought back by
reducing their prices on competitive items. 3 This in turn
triggered a chain reaction of extravagant pricing claims by
both kinds of merchants, often abetted by inflated manu-
facturers' retail price lists and tickets.
But since the department stores could seldom advertise
that their new low prices afforded a saving over discount
house prices, they had to compare them either with their own
former prices or with the manufacturers' suggested retail
prices, which generally reflected the traditional forty per-
cent markup. On the other hand, as department store
prices dropped to approach discount house prices, the dis-
counters could no longer compare prices with department
stores so dramatically. Thus, they too began to compare
their prices with the manufacturers' suggested retail prices. 4
As time went on, there came to be little or no difference in
the price of many comparable items between discount houses
and department stores, 5 and the manufacturers' list prices
had become meaningless because very few retailers continued
to use the traditional forty percent markup.'" Yet, whether,
businessmen might have preferred to operate otherwise or
not,'7 price competition forced them to advertise com-
paratively as their competitors did. The consumer became
13 See Silberman, The Department Stores Are Waking Up, Fortune, July
1962, p. 143.
14 Compare Silberman, The Discounters Choose Their Weapons, Fortune,
May 1962, p. 118.
15 For a survey comparing the variation between list prices and retail prices
of automatic washing machines sold by four groups of retailers (discount
houses, department stores, large volume outlets, and small volume outlets) in
nine major United States cities, see Jung, Price Variations Among Discount
Houses and Other Retailers: a Re-Appraisal, 37 J. oF RETAILING 13 (1961).
16 See Weiss, The Decline of the List Price, Advertising Age, Nov. 13,
1961, p. 140.
1 7 See Foy, MANAGEMIENT'S PART IN ACHIEVING PRIcE REsPECTABILITY
7 (1958): "The roll call of those in favor of sound pricing would be almost
as impressive, I am sure, as the classical census of those in favor of mother-
hood. For as surely as he votes against sin on an open ballot, every good
business man decries cutthroat pricing."
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confused, critical and skeptical.'" By 1958, there was a
sizable agitation for reform.-'
Fictitious Pricing Case Law to 1958, As
Reflected in the Guides
The FTC issued its Guides Against Fictitious Pricing
on October 2, 1958.20 The Guides were intended to spell
out in layman's language the requirements of trade regula-
tion law applicable to price advertising. They also served
the purpose of "spotlighting persistent violations." Thus,
they reflected the Commission's informal experience in this
field, as well as the accumulated case precedent. Perhaps,
also, in ambiguous areas they projected the FTC staff's view,
with some blessing by the Commission, of what the law
ought to be. Although the Guides state that they were
adopted by the FTC "for the use of its staff in the evaluation
of pricing representations in advertising," they also note
that they were released to the public "in the interest of ob-
taining voluntary, simultaneous and prompt cooperation." 21
18 Phoney Price-Cutting: Threat to Advertising Confidence, Time, Nov. 10,
1958, p. 78: "More and more customers are becoming suspicious of price
cuts. A study by Pittsburgh's Duquesne University shows that buyers strongly
suspect claims of price cuts above 27.5%." See ZELOMF.K, THE INTERRELTION-
SHIP OF MERCHANDISING AND PRICING III (1958).
19 This agitation for truth in advertising was not a new phenomenon. In
1911 the trade magazine Printer's Ink published a Model Statute which many
states subsequently adopted. Revised in 1945, some forty-three states had
passed the Printer's Ink Model Statute or a variation of it by 1957. See
Day, Ad Ethics Are Higher Today Because Honest Ads Work Best,
Printer's Ink, June 14, 1957, p. 21.
20The Guides Against Fictitious Pricing were issued as a part of the
FTC's Guide Program, begun several years earlier. See address by John P.
Sullivan, Legal Adviser on Guides, FTC Bureau of Consultation, Federal
Trade Commission Conference on Public Deception, December 21, 1959: "The
Guide Program had its beginning on September 15, 1955 with the issuance
of Cigarette Advertising Guides. This was followed on August 27, 1958
by Advertising Guides for the Tire Industry. On October 10, 1958, the
Commission launched a new approach in issuing Guides against a practice
that was common to many industries. Trade Practice Rules and prior Guides
were issued to particular industries, but the new Guides against Fictitious
Pricing cut across all industry lines."
21 "In issuing Guides, it was neither the intent or purpose of the Commis-
sion to inform the adventuresome how far they can skate on thin ice. Rather,
they may be likened to caution signs on the highway, warning the motor;st
where he must slow down to take other action to avoid mishap." Ibid.
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The Guides set forth nine principles which the Com-
mission uses to evaluate price representations in advertising.
These principles were distilled from past cases and repre-
sented an informal "codification" of the law as reflected in
those cases. Also included in the Guides were examples of
specific words and phrases the Commission had previously
held to be deceptive. Thus, it may serve as a useful review
of the fictitious pricing methods used up to 1958 briefly to
examine the Guides seriatim.
The three most common pre-Guide advertising dodges
used by retailers were: (1) advertising an article for sale
at a low price when the specific article available for sale
was not the one advertised, but a similar or comparable
one; 22 (2) quoting a bargain price below a purported regular
retail price which was not in fact the regular retail price
for the article in the trade area where the statement was
made; 2 13 and (3) quoting a bargain price below the ad-
vertiser's recent selling price when in actuality he had
made no recent sales at that price.24 Guide I proscribes
22 E.g., Mandel Bros. v. FTC, 254 F2d 18 (7th Cir. 1958), rev'd on other
grounds, 359 U.S. 385 (1959) (respondent advertised in a newspaper that fur
products offered at a price of $244 were "Usually $299 to $399"; evidence
showed that the specific garments advertised had never retailed at those
prices, having instead a usual and regular retail price of $244 or $288).
23 E.g., Awon Film & Supply Co., 54 F.T.C. 1144 (1958); Maxwell Dis-
trib. Co., 54 F.T.C. 260 (1957); Charlet Undergarment Corp., 52 F.T.C. 924
(1956); Benjamin & Edward J. Gross Co., 51 F.T.C. 1248 (1955); House-
hold Sewing Mach. Co., 52 F.T.C. 250 (1955); Robert Hall Clothes, Inc.,
50 F.T.C. 196 (1953); Plaza Luggage & Supply Co., 44 F.T.C. 443 (1948);
Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 33 F.T.C. 282 (1941); Goodyear Tire &
Rubber Co., 33 F.T.C. 398 (1941); B. F. Goodrich Co., 33 F.T.C. 312 (1941);
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 33 F.T.C. 334 (1941); Western Auto Supply Co., 33
F.T.C. 356 (1941). Post Guide cases: e.g., Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278
F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 883 (1960); Harsam Distrib., Inc.
v. FTC, 263 F.2d 396 (2d Cir. 1959); Gimbel Bros., 3 CCH TRADE REG.
REP. 16020 (FTC July 26, 1962) ; Giant Foods, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
15937 (FTC June 13, 1962); George's Radio & Television Co., 3 CCH
TRADE REa. RE. 15691 (FTC Jan. 19, 1962); Bond Stores, Inc., 56 F.T.C.
716 (1960); Filderman Corp., 56 F.T.C. 685 (1959); Hutchinson Chem. Corp.,
55 F.T.C. 1942 (1959). For a case dismissing such a charge on grounds
that the evidence was insufficient to establish what the usual and regular retail
price of the advertised product was, see Sun Gold Indus., 56 F.T.C. 1368
(1960).
24 E.g., FTC v. Standard Educ. Soc'y, 302 U.S. 112 (1937) ; Mandel Bros.
v. FTC, supra note 22; Consumer Sales Corp. v. FTC, 198 F.2d 404
(2d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 912 (1953); Thomas v. FTC, 116 F.2d
347 (10th Cir. 1940); Awon Film & Supply Co., supra note 23; Southern
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those three types of representations by stating that a savings
claim should not be used unless it applies to the specific
article offered for sale and is either a saving from the usual
and customary retail price25 of the article in the trade
area when it is advertised or from the advertiser's usual
retail price of the article in the recent, regular course of
business. 6 In addition, the advertisement must clearly show
which of these two types of discount applies.
Guide II states some specific limitations on "reduction"
or "savings" claims. Some advertisements had compared a
low "bargain" price with a higher "retail" price, on the
theory that the comparison was justified by a few isolated
sales at the higher price, even though the majority of
previous sales had been made at the lower price.2 Savings
claims, according to this Guide, should not be made if based
on an artificial markup, infrequent or isolated sales, or on
Piano Co., 54 F.T.C. 640 (1957); Walside, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 572 (1957);
Artistic Modern, Inc., 54 F.T.C. 225 (1957) ; Rena-Ware Distrib., Inc., 54
F.T.C. 94 (1957); American Albums, Inc., 53 F.T.C. 913 (1956); Approved
Photographer's Ass'n, 53 F.T.C. 610 (1956); American Broadloom Carpet
Co., 53 F.T.C. 239 (1956); George's Radio & Television Co., 50 F.T.C. 580
(1953) ; Zlotnick The Furrier, Inc., 48 F.T.C. 1068 (1952); The Camera
Man, 42 F.T.C. 393 (1946) ; United Art Studios, 36 F.T.C. 977 (1943) ; Erwin
Feather Quilt Co., 30 F.T.C. 1079 (1940); M. E. Moss Mfg. Co., 19 F.T.C.
467 (1934); Perfolastic Inc., 16 F.T.C. 157 (1932) ; Domino House, Inc., 14
F.T.C. 432 (1931); School of Applied Art, 11 F.T.C. 431 (1927). Post-
Guide cases: e.g., Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, smpra note 23; Basic Books, Inc.
v. FTC, 276 F.2d 718 (7th Cir. 1960); Gimbel Bros., supra note 23;
Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. .r 15246 (FTC, June
16, 1961). For a case dismissing such a charge on grounds that the evidence
was insufficient to establish the respondent had never sold at the advertised
price, see City Stores Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 15805 (FTC March
27, 1962).
25Guide I(b) lists as examples the following phrases used in advertise-
ments which have been held to be interpreted by the consumer to mean the
usual and customary retail price: "Maker's List Price," "Manufacturer's List
Price," "Manufacturer's Suggested Retail Price," "Sold Nationally At," "Na-
tionally Advertised At" and "Value."
26 Guide I(c) lists as examples the following phrases used in advertisements
which have been held to be interpreted by the consumer to mean the retail
price charged by the advertiser in his recent, regular course of business:
"regularly," "usually," "formerly," "originally," "reduced," "was - now
- " made to sell for," "woven to sell for," "our list price," " -
% off," "save up to $ --," "special," "you save $ - " and "$50
dress--35."
27 Cf. Harsam Distrib., Inc. v. FTC, stpra note 23. For a case dismissing
such a complaint on grounds that respondent had disposed of the business in
which the practice occurred, see Chester H. Roth Co., 55 F.T.C. 1076 (1959).
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a past price that was not in use in the recent, regular
course of business, unless this fact is adequately disclosed.
Other advertisements claimed that the price of an article
affords the buyer a saving when in fact the article advertised
is compared pricewise with a different article of superior
quality.2" Guide III attempts to discourage this type of
advertising without forbidding honest savings claims on
truly comparable products. It thus requires the advertiser
to disclose that the low price of the advertised article is
not being compared with the former or with the usual and
customary price of that same article, but rather with
similar but comparable merchandise of like grade and quality.
Furthermore, the more expensive merchandise mentioned in
the advertisement must in fact be generally available in that
trade area at the comparative price stated, or its unavail-
ability must be stated. 9
A favorite trick of advertisers is to represent that prices
are reduced because of alleged special events such as
"clearance" or "manufacturer's close out," which in fact
never occur. 0 Guide IV declares that advertisements should
not imply that an article was offered for sale at a saving
because of some "unusual event or manner of business"
unless the statement is true." Some advertisements have
represented that two articles could be purchased for the
price of one when in fact the price charged for both articles
was twice the usual price of one such article."2 Guide V
states that no claim to sell two articles for the price of
one should be made unless the price for both is the usual
and customary retail price in the recent, regular course of
2 8 E.g., Mandel Bros. v. FTC, supra note 22; Miss Youth Form Creations
Corp., 52 F.T.C. 413 (1955).
29 Guide III(c) states: "An example of a statement which would be
proper within the provisions of Guide III if based on facts is: 'Dacron suit
$20.00-Comparable suits $25.00."
30 E.g., Kay Jewelry Stores, Inc. 54 F.T.C. 548 (1957); Del Mar Sewing
Mach. Co., 49 F.T.C. 1257 (1953); Illinois Merchandise Mart, 45 F.T.C. 58
(1948).
31 Guide IV sets forth the following phrases as illustrative of those which
so imply: "Special Purchase," "Clearance," "Marked Down From Stock,"
"Exceptional Purchase," "Manufacturer's Close-Out," "Advance Sale" and
"Sale."32 E.g., Thomas v. FTC, supra note 24.
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business for the single article. Similarly, Guide VI governs
the announcement of an offer of a "1 sale" or "half-price
sale," when the offer of an article at this special price is
conditioned upon the purchase of another article at the same
time. Purchasers may be misled if the price charged for
the additional article required to be purchased is not the
usual and regular price but rather a higher price which
will afford the seller a profit on the combined sale.3 When
an advertisement states that an article can be purchased
for 10 or at half-price, this Guide requires that it be ac-
companied by a disclosure of the conditions of the offer
and that the stated price for the additional article not be
inflated.
Mail-order sellers often represent to consumers that they
are wholesalers, and are able to offer their merchandise to
those on a special mailing list at wholesale prices. In fact,
the price offered in such cases has sometimes been higher
than the wholesale price paid by retailers, the sellers have
not actually been wholesalers but retailers, and the price
quoted in the catalog has been the usual retail price for
the article.3 4  To deter this type of advertising, Guide VII
prohibits claims that a price is a "factory" or "wholesale"
price when it is not the same as that paid by retailers.
In fact, most fictitious price advertisements have orig-
inated with retailers. But one common method of fictitious
pricing is peculiar to manufacturers and arises out of the
practice of preticketing. Many manufacturers affix retail
price tags or labels to their products at the factory, thus
"suggesting" the retail value to the retailer and, ultimately,
to the consumer. If retailers generally sell this pre-priced
article for less than the price on the preticket, fictitious pric-
33 E.g., Electrical Center, 48 F.T.C. 726 (1952); Firestone Tire & Rubber
Co., 33 F.T.C. 282 (1941) ; Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 33 F.T.C. 298
(1941) ; B. F. Goodrich Co., 33 F.T.C. 312 (1941); Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
33 F.T.C. 334 (1941); Western Auto Supply Co., 33 F.T.C. 356 (1941); cf.
Kalwajtys v. FTC, 237 F.2d 654 (7th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1025
(1957).
34 E.g., Progress Tailoring Co. v. FTC, 153 F.2d 103 (7th Cir. 1946) ; L. &
C. Mayers Co. v. FTC, 97 F.2d 365 (2d Cir. 1938); Brown Fence & Wire
Co. v. FTC, 64 F.2d 934 (6th Cir. 1933); Macher Watch & Jewelry Co., 32
F.T.C. 763 (1941).
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ing problems arise.3 5 The Federal Trade Commission has
held that the preticketed price constitutes a representation
to the consumer of the usual and regular retail price.36
Thus the retailer who uses the preticket while the product
is generally selling for less engages in a deceptive act or
practice by holding forth a nonexistent saving to the con-
sumer.3" But in the same situation the manufacturer has
also been held to have engaged in deceptive practices because
he supplied the means used to deceive the consumer . 3  The
Commission states in Guide VIII that an article should
not be preticketed with a price figure which is greater than
the usual and customary retail price of that product, and
a manufacturer who puts erroneously marked products in
the hands of retailers will himself be guilty of deception;
furthermore, it is no defense to say that he thought the
preticketed price was the usual retail price since he is legally
charged with knowledge of the merchandising "facts of
life" 11 about his products after they leave the factory.4"
35E.g., Ma-Ro Hosiery Co., 53 F.T.C. 862 (1957); Neuville, Inc., 53
F.T.C. 436 (1956); Orloff Co., 52 F.T.C. 709 (1956); Trade Labs., Inc., 25
F.T.C. 937 (1937); Mills Sales Co., 23 F.T.C. 518 (1936); FTC v. Holland
Piano Mfg. Co., 3 F.T.C. 31 (1920). Post Guide cases: Baltimore Luggage
Co. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 860 (1962);
Clinton Watch Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368
U.S. 952 (1962); Rayex Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 15823 (FTC April
2, 1962); Helbros Watch Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1f 15654 (FTC Dec.
26, 1961).
36 E.g., Mills Sales Co., supra note 35.
3 See, e.g., Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 364 U.S. 883 (1960); see note 6 supra.
38 E.g., Clinton Watch Co. v. FTC, 291 F.2d 838 (7th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 368 U.S. 952 (1962); see note 7 supra.
39 Orloff Co., supra note 35.
40 Guide IX deals with the relatively infrequent practice of advertising
price savings on "imperfect, irregular, seconds" items. It provides: "No
comparative price should be quoted in connection with an article offered for
sale which is imperfect, irregular, or a second, unless it is accompanied by a
clear and conspicuous disclosure that such comparative price refers to the
price of the article if perfect. Such comparative price should not be used
unless (1) it is the price at which the advertiser usually and customarily
sells the article without defects, or (2) it is the price at which the article
without defects is usually and customarily sold at the comparative price in
the trade area, or areas, where the statement is made, or if such article is not
so available, that fact is clearly disclosed."
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Present Status and Effect of the Guides
The Guides close with the statement that they "do not
constitute a finding in and will not affect the disposition
of any formal or informal matter before the Commission."
Read in conjunction with their opening sentence-i.e., that
the Guides have been adopted "for the use of [the Com-
mission's] staff in the evaluation of pricing representations
in advertising"-it is apparent that the original purpose
for which the Guides were promulgated did not necessarily
contemplate their use as substantive law.4 A recent decision
of the FTC, Gimbel Bros.,4" however, has apparently raised
their status as legal guideposts for pricing practices.
Gimbel's had used the words "list price," "usually,"
"regularly" and "originally" in advertisements which the
Commission alleged were fictitious because of implied false
representations about the prices at which the goods had
actually been selling in the area.43 The hearing examiner's
initial decision dismissed the complaint on the ground that
there was no evidence in the record to prove what meaning
the public attached to these particular words despite the
specific meaning given to them in the Guides; therefore,
since the Guides could not be looked to as substantive law
or as a substitute for evidence, the Commission's burden of
proving customer deception had not been sustained.
On appeal, the Commission reversed the hearing ex-
aminer's initial decision. Recognizing that the Guides are
"not substantive law in and of themselves," Commissioner
MacIntyre's opinion declared that "this does not mean that
they may be completely ignored and rejected in the fashion
herein accomplished." " The opinion then explained the func-
tion of the Guides in these significant words:
41 See address by John P. Sullivan, Federal Trade Commission Conference
on Public Deception, December 21, 1959; "Guides are exactly what their name
purports them to be. They are not law."
423 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 16020 (FTC July 26, 1962).
43These words are found in Guide I(c) as examples of words which have
been held to be representations of the usual and customary price. See note
26 upra.
44 Gimbel Bros., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 16020, at 20858 (FTC
July 26, 1962).
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What, then, is the proper status of the "Guides" with respect to a
Commission proceeding? When viewed as a compilation and
summary of the expertise acquired by the Commission from having
repeatedly decided cases dealing with identical false claims, the
role of the "Guides" becomes apparent. They serve to inform
the public and the bar of the interpretation which the Commission,
unaided by further consumer testimony or other evidence, will
place upon advertisements using the words and phrases therein
set out. It is our view that words and phrases of the type
set out in the "Guides" must be consistently dealt with by the
Commission or its decisions will have no meaning or value.
Only by consistent interpretation can some order be brought to
to the semantic jungle of advertising.45
The Commission then went ahead to hold that Gimbel had
engaged in deceptive advertising and entered its order to
cease and desist.
Such emphasis on the Guides by the Commission in its
decisions makes it increasingly important that they reflect
accurately the current thinking of the Commission. At this
writing, FTC staff attorneys are in fact engaged in the
preparation of a revised version of the original Guides41
which may be adopted by the -Commission in the next few
months. If they follow past precedent, the revised Guides
will incorporate the most recent case law developments as
well as the FTC's administrative experience since pro-
mulgation of the original Guides in 1958.
RECENT FICTITIOUS PRICING CASES INVOLVING
MANUFACTURERS
Predictably, the merchandising world has shown an
avid interest in the Guides Against Deceptive Pricing. A
half-million copies were distributed in the first year after
their issuance."' Moreover, they stimulated state and local
action. On January 1, 1959, for example, the Better
45Ibid. (Emphasis added.)
46 Interview with William D. Dixon, Attorney, FTC Bureau of Industry
Guidance, Sept. 5, 1962.
47 U.S. FTC, ANNUAL REPORT 67 (1961).
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Business Bureau of New York City issued its "Standards
for Retail Advertising of Price Reduction, Comparison and
Saving Claims," which were based upon the FTC's Guides.
But the dynamics of retail merchandising defy any static
solution; new and even more perplexing problems have arisen
to plague the Commission since 1958.
The recent cases point up four common practices of
manufacturers not clearly or adequately covered by the
Guides. In each instance the Commission has nonetheless
claimed that the manufacturer is guilty of placing in the
hands of a reseller an instrument of price deception. The
practices, to be described in detail, are: (1) a manu-
facturer's purposeful promoting of periodic reduced-price
sales by retailer-customers to insure that a significant pro-
portion of the manufacturer's total sales will be at below-
normal sale prices; (2) his supplying of mail-order houses
with catalog insert sheets listing both a purported "retail"
price and a so-called "wholesale" price at which the goods
are actually sold; (3) the preticketing of nationally-dis-
tributed products with a uniform price when the regular
retail price varies in different parts of the country; and
(4) the furnishing of retailers with "suggested" list prices.
Manufacturer-Sponsored Sales
The periodic or seasonal sale is a traditional and
effective method by which retailers seek to stimulate business.
These sales are frequently promoted by the manufacturer-
supplier, who temporarily cuts his own price to facilitate
the retailer's price reduction. Seemingly, no deception oc-
curs if the retailer's sale price is actually lower than the
usual price charged during the rest of the year. The Kreiss 48
case stands as a warning, however, that such sales cannot
be depended upon to mask fictitious pricing schemes.
Kreiss involved department store sales of women's
hosiery which the manufacturer advertised in cooperation
with its retailers at a stated retail price. But twice each
4856 F.T.C. 1421 (1960).
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year, for periods of two to four weeks, the manufacturer
offered the hosiery to retailer-customers at fifty percent off
the regular wholesale price on condition that the retailers,
in turn, would sell the hosiery at half the advertised price
during corresponding sale periods. Although the advertised
price was maintained throughout the year except during
the sale periods, ninety-five percent of all the manufacturer's
sales to the retailers were at the lower sale price. In a three-
two decision, the Commission dismissed the complaint, finding
decisive the fact that the higher price was actually main-
tained throughout the year except for the two brief sale
periods. But the two FTC members dissenting were con-
vinced that the sale price at which such a large percentage
of the hosiery was sold was in reality the "customary and
usual" retail price and the advertised price was a fictitious
one.
49
On the basis of the close split in the Kreiss case and
changes in the Commission membership since it was decided,"
it would be surprising if the FTC did not challenge similar
types of promotional schemes, particularly where the sales
price is far below an advertised or preticketed price and the
sales endure for unusually long periods of time or recur at
frequent intervals. 1
Catalog Insert Sheets
In addition to their "regular" line of merchandise
sold through traditional retail outlets, many manufacturers
also market a "special," "promotional," or "jobber" line.
This merchandise, which is frequently of distinctive design
49 "In my opinion the price at which 95% of respondent's merchandise is
sold is the regular price as indicated by this record." Id. at 1431 (dissenting
opinion of Commissioner Secrest).
S0 Four of the members who participated have been replaced (only Com-
missioner Anderson remains). This makes the precedential value of the
Kreiss case doubtful, especially since the majority relied mainly on a narrow
pleading ground-i.e., that it was not false, as alleged in the complaint, for
Kreiss to represent that the amount charged ten or eleven months a year
was "customary and usual." Compare the Commission's more recent use of
the phrase "generally prevailing" in Rayex Corp., 3 CCH TPADE REG. REP.
15823 (FTC April 2, 1962).
51 See Chester H. Roth Co., 55 F.T.C. 1076 (1959).
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and may be of lower quality than the regular line, is mar-
keted through a relatively new type of distributor known
as the "catalog jobber."
Though methods vary considerably, the typical catalog
jobber is essentially a retailer. 2 He purchases merchandise
from a number of manufacturers and solicits prospective
customers through a handsome color catalog. His clientele
ranges from individual consumers to business and fraternal
organizations and a few small town retail merchants. Some
catalog jobbers also maintain display rooms where they sell
some merchandise to all comers.
Each manufacturer supplying the catalog jobber cus-
tomarily furnishes printed "insert sheets" or, more recently,
a "color positive" from which the catalog jobber may print
such insert sheets, illustrating the manufacturer's products.
Two prices are given in the catalog for each item. In some
instances they are stated as "retail price" and "your cost,"
the latter being half the stated "retail price." Other catalogs
use "coded prices" and instruct the manufacturers to make
up the insert sheets accordingly. Here the "retail price"
is preceded by a series of letters and numbers, such as
"20 K 0169 TG 525 Necklace $10.50." "1 The catalog con-
tains an explanation that the cost of the item is concealed
in these numbers and sets forth the decoding procedure.
The price when decoded is typically exactly half the "retail
price." For example, the coded price of the "$10.50" neck-
lace above is found in the numbers 525, being $5.25 or
half of $10.50. All of this so-called jobber merchandise is
sold to all customers at the "coded" or "your cost" price
rather than at the higher "retail price."
Oddly, the FTC's first case on this method of pricing
did not involve a catalog jobber, but a manufacturer which
had furnished catalog insert sheets. In Leeds Travelwear,
Inc.,54 the Commission found that supplying such insert
sheets was deceptive because the generally prevailing retail
52 For a complete discussion of a catalog jobber's operation, see Coro,
Inc., No. 8346, FTC, June 1, 1962 (Initial Decision).5 3 Ibid.
54 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 15997 (FTC July 20, 1962).
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price of the manufacturer's merchandise was not the price
stated as "retail," but rather the coded price.
In Leeds, however, it would seem the Commission has
attacked the wrong end of the dragon. There are many
more manufacturer-suppliers than catalog jobbers, and the
pressure for two-price insert sheets comes from the catalog
houses. The Commission's pending cases against catalog
jobbers, on the other hand, obviously are more sensible in
terms of effort and prospective results.55 When and if this
method of doing business is clearly condemned in a catalog-
jobber case, the way will be cleared for an industry-wide
reform of the two-price catalog insert sheet.
Nationwide Preticketing
Preticketing cases were routine long before 1958.11 and
Guide VIII covered the standard technique up to that
time. The cases generally involved extremely exaggerated
price tickets where the manufacturer, actually or in effect,
informed the retailer that his product could be advertised
at the preticketed figure, sold for a much smaller sum,
and still provide an adequate profit. The more recent
case of Baltimore Luggage Co., 7 however, involved much
less extreme facts which were in a legal limbo under the
standards laid down in the Guides.
The respondent sold its product to 1,276 retailers located
in 46 states and the District of Columbia. It preticketed
the merchandise with tags bearing the price of $12.95. The
record indicated that 70 percent, or 889, of its retailer-
customers, located in 34 states, sold the luggage at the
preticketed price. The remaining 30 percent, or 387 retailers,
located in 12 states, including the metropolitan trade areas
of New York, Philadelphia and Washington, D. C., sold the
luggage for approximately $2.00 less. In dollar-volume
55 Majestic Elec. Supply Co., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 15972 (FTC
Aug. 13, 1962). A complaint was issued against another catalog jobber
(Continental Products, Inc., No. 8517) on June 29, 1962.
56 See note 35 supra.57 Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1961), cert.
denied, 369 U.S. 860 (1962).
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terms, 62.5 percent of the merchandise was sold at the
preticketed price.
On those facts, the Commission held that the pre-
ticketed price could mislead consumers in the trade areas
in which it did not correspond with the usual and regular
retail price. 8 This conclusion was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Commission rejected
the Baltimore Luggage Company's argument that its pre-
tickets should be judged on the basis of the entire national
retail market,59 reasoning that the consumer is not interested
in bargains available in another section of the country, but
only "in the trade area in which he is making his purchase." o
Manufacturers' List Prices
Many manufacturers furnish retailers with illustrative
literature containing "suggested list prices" or "suggested
retail prices." 11 These are purportedly for the retailer's
use, to aid him in pricing the product to consumers at a
competitive, yet profitable, figure. If this were the only
use made of price lists, they would occasion no fictitious
pricing problems for the retailer or the manufacturer.62
Retailers, however, sometimes display "list" or "suggested
retail" prices directly to consumers or use them in com-
5 8 Baltimore Luggage Co., No. 7683, FTC, Mar. 15, 1961.
59 See Brief for Petitioners in Court of Appeals, pp. 5-7, Baltimore Lug-
gage Co. v. FTC, supra note 57.6
oBaltimore Luggage Co., supra note 58, at 3. In affirming this holding,
the Court of Appeals' opinion commented that "no authorities have been cited
to us, nor do we find any, which hold that, before the Commission may pro-
scribe a deceptive practice on the part of a manufacturer which is widespread,
it must be shown that the practice is not only widespread but universal."
296 F.2d at 611.
61 E.g., Morris Lober & Associates, 55 F.T.C. 209 (1958) ; National Silver
Co., 27 F.T.C. 596 (1938).
62 There can be no deception to the consumer if he does not see the price
the manufacturer has suggested as a retail price. In a preticketing case, the
Commission said: "There is, of course, no convention requiring manufacturers
and distributors to use preticketing as a means for 'suggesting' resale prices
to their dealers. They could as well simply enclose a list of suggested prices
with each shipment. That procedure would involve no possibility lof the sort
of deception with which we are concerned, assuming the price list information
was not passed on to the public." Rayex Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP.
15823 (FTC April 2, 1962).
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parative advertising as the basis for price-saving claims. 3
Thus, representations such as "G. E. Automatic Toaster
$13.27, Mfg. List $19.95" have been held to be deceptive
on the part of a retail seller unless $19.95 is in fact the usual
and regular retail price, because they misleadingly imply
that the consumer can save 6.68 by buying the article at
the advertiser's store.64 Moreover, the FTC has emphatically
held that this particular deception was not cured by a
disclaimer elsewhere in the advertisement, obviously based
upon a reading of the 1958 Guides, stating that the use
of the term "manufacturer's list" does not imply that the
advertiser has ever sold the products at that price or that
the products are for sale generally in the area for that
price.y3
Despite the earlier retailer cases, it was not until the
recent decision in Regina Corp.6 that a manufacturer was
held responsible for furnishing deceptive price lists to re-
tailers.67 The Commission found that Regina's "suggested
list prices" were higher than the usual and customary prices
at which its floor polishers and vacuum cleaners sold at
retail, and that Regina was aware that this was so when
it made up the lists. Emphasizing the respondent's knowl-
edge, the Commission ordered Regina to cease and desist
from supplying distributors or retailers with price lists or
63 E.g., Giant Foods, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1 15937 (FTC June
13, 1962).
64 Ibid.
65 Id. at 20746. The disclaimer stated in part: "The manufacturer's list
prices referred to in this advertisement are inserted to assist you in iden-
tification of the products and to allow you to compare accurately the selling
prices offered here and elsewhere. The use of the term manufacturer's list
or similar terminology in our advertising is not to imply that Giant has ever
sold the advertised products at such list prices or that the products are being
offered for sale generally in the area at such list prices. . . . Giant includes
these manufacturer's list prices so that you may make simple, intelligent
comparisons between our selling prices and those of others."
66 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 1f 15936 (FTC June 13, 1962).
67 Regina was perhaps foreshadowed by National Silver Co., 27 F.T.C. 596
(1938), which held a wholesaler (which had falsely represented itself to be a
manufacturer) for publishing price lists greatly in excess of the "reasonable
or normal" retail value of its products. See also three cases involving manu-
facturers which sold their goods through company-owned outlets: Firestone
Tire & Rubber Co., Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. and B. F. Goodrich Co.,
supra note 23.
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other literature when it "knows or has reason to know" that
such prices are in excess of the usual and customary retail
price of the product.68
Tau MANUFAcTu1mR!'S DILIDMAIA
Functions of Manufacturer-Suggested Retail Prices
The Regina case pinpoints a basic dilemma faced by any
manufacturer who wants to use either. suggested list prices
or pretickets as part of his distributional mechanism. Any
discussion of the legal and policy considerations involved in
these practices should be: preceded by understanding what
functions they serve in the commercial world.6 9 It would
be gross error to assume that most manufacturers who pre-
ticket their products or distribute price lists to their cus-
tomers do so to promote deception, when in fact those
practices are traditional in many lines and are thought to
serve legitimate business ends.7" Therefore, the question
68 Regina Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 15936 (FTC June 13, 1962).
A reading of the Regina opinion raises the additional question whether the
Commission considered the manufacturer's knowledge or reason to know that
its list prices would be used as part of the retailer's advertising campaign.
Price lists themselves vary greatly and may provide clues to their intended use.
Some are attractively illustrated and printed, and thus easily adapted for sales
promotion at the retail level. On the other hand, simpler printed or mimeo-
graphed lists, especially if they reveal "dealer's cost" as well as the suggested
retail price, are unlikely to be shown to customers. But prices from any kind
of list are equally usable as the basis for price comparisons in media ad-
vertisements.
69Although the FTC has never proceeded in any case involving only a
manufacturer's nationally advertised price, this practice would appear to have
at least as much potentiality for deception as preticketing-i.e., the manufac-
turer's statement of the item's retail price is directly communicated to the
consumer; if it overstates the generally prevailing price in any area, prospec-
tive buyers may be deceived. Nationally advertised prices were indirectly
involved in Niresk Indus., Inc. v. FTC, 278 F.2d 337 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
364 U.S. 883 (1960) (mail-order firm unsuccessfully attempted to justify
"list" price advertisement on ground that manufacturer advertised product in
"Life" at that price), and Harsam Distrib., Inc. v. FTC, 263 F.2d 396 (2d
Cir. 1959) (manufacturer advertised White Christmas perfume in "Vogue" at
$18.50, then furnished retailer with store display, "Advertised in Vogue at
$18.50-save 90%").
70 But cf. Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1961),
cert. denied, 369 U.S. 860 (1962). Although the evidence in that case showed
that seventy percent of the respondent's retail dealers sold the manufacturer's
products at the preticketed price, the Court of Appeals quoted with approval
the Commission's language: "Respondent's purpose is self-evident-to make it
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arises, "Why attempt to price the product at all at the
primary level of distribution?" Wouldn't it be simpler and
safer for the manufacturer simply to set the price he charges
others for the product, based on his cost plus a margin of
profit, and then leave other members of the distributional
hierarchy free to determine the markup necessary to cover
their own cost and profit? "'
One answer is that the manufacturer does it to meet
competition. It is a commercial fact of life that pretickets
and price lists are customary concomitants of many kinds
of merchandise. When retail merchants demand them for
their own competitive use, any manufacturer who refuses
to comply places himself at a disadvantage to other manu-
facturers who are willing to oblige. 2  A second reason for
such devices is that, despite the spate of fictitious pricing
cases, many-perhaps most-preticketed or price listed items
are actually sold at their indicated prices.73
Thus manufacturers are impelled by the same kind of
motives that lead them to support fair trade laws. They
appear to the store customers that the store was selling the luggage at approxi-
mately two dollars less than the regular retail price, and the customer would
believe that he or she was getting a reduced price." 296 F.2d at 611.
71 For a discussion of the premise that some manufacturers determine first
the retail price at which a planned product will sell and work backward from
that figure to see how much can be spent for production costs, see the testi-
mony of Lannon F. Mead, president of Regina Corporation, in Regina Corp.,
supra note 68, reproduced in Electrical Merchandising Week, Sept. 25, 1961,
p. 9. For an indication that one large retailer also operates in this manner,
supervising the manufacture and transportation of the product to its stores,
see Silberman, The Department Stores Are Waking Up, Fortune, July 1962,
p. 143, at 251.
72 It might appear that if such conduct were flatly declared illegal in one
case, all other manufacturers would then discontinue it; but experience teaches
otherwise. Cf. FTC v. C. E. Niehoff & Co., 355 U.S. 411 (1958).
73 Many low cost items have the price printed on the product itself or upon
the container in which it comes at the request of the retailer because such
printing adds nothing to the manufacturer's costs, whereas a retailer may
devote as much as twenty-two percent of its total man-hours to having retail
prices stamped on its inventory, much of which is sold at the price that the
manufacturer would print on it. See The Price-Marking Problem, Modern
Packaging, Sept. 1959, p. 99. See generally Sounding Board: What Do You
Think of Pre-Pricing By Packagers?-Part I, Modem Packaging, Dec. 1959,
p. 65; Part II, Modern Packaging, Jan. 1960, p. 57. Anent products that are
sold below pre-marked prices, see S. 3745, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. (1962), the
"Truth in Packaging" bill that would prevent manufacturers from making any
"cents-off" markings on labels. See Advertising Age, Oct. 1, 1962, p. 70.
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are unconvinced by the apparent economic paradox that a
manufacturer should be able to increase sales and profits by
lowering retail prices rather than maintaining them. In-
deed, it has been suggested that manufacturers who favor
fair trade probably already have some degree of monopoly
power over their products, so that they will not lose sales
and profits by maintaining a higher price.74
Attempts to justify manufacturer-suggested prices have
also relied upon their claimed usefulness to retailers and
consumers in providing a price norm or standard of com-
parison. It has been contended, for example, that retailers
carry so many goods in such varying levels of quality that
they have no way of knowing that $29.95 is the "proper"
retail price for an automatic coffeemaker-that only the
manufacturer has sufficient knowledge to predict what con-
sumers will pay.75 This argument may have some validity
for inexperienced retailers or ones in small towns. Similarly,
it is contended that manufacturers' prices aid the consumer
by protecting him against being overcharged 7' and also by
giving him a method of identifying the particular item that
is more comprehensible than model numbers or product
names.77  The FTC's position, however, is that the utility
of manufacturers' prices as a superior means of identification
is more than offset by the greater possibility of deception in-
herent in their use if they do not accurately reflect the
generally prevailing retail price.78
74 Telser, Why Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J. OF L. &
EcoNoMics 86 (1960).
75 See the testimony of Neil H. Borden, Professor of Marketing, Gradu-
ate School of Business Administration, Harvard University, before the hear-
ing examiner in Regina Corp., supra note 68, reproduced in Electrical Mer-
chandising Week, supra note 71.
76 This argument generally includes a reference to the Automobile Infor-
mation Disclosure Act, 72 Stat. 326, 15 U.S.C. § 1232 (1958), which requires
manufacturers to "preticket" automobiles with a suggested list price. In
Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, 296 F.2d 608 (4th Cir. 1961), cert. denied,
369 U.S. 860 (1962), the court rejected this argument by noting that the
policy behind this Act was the protection of the public against "price pack-
ing"-a phenomenon peculiar to the automobile industry.
77 Regina Corp., supra note 68.
78 Id. at 20835.
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The Legal Distinction Between Pretickets and
Price Lists
For whatever reason the manufacturer decides to in-
fluence the retail price, his next problem is whether to use
pretickets, list prices, or both. His choice may be governed
by the differing legal standards applicable to the different
categories.
Although preticketing is not yet illegal per se,11 it has
become a very dangerous activity. In the first place, this
practice often occurs in highly competitive lines where prices
fluctuate from one trade area to another and even in the
same trade area, often making the concept of a "generally pre-
vailing" retail price virtually meaningless.8 0 Moreover, while
lack of knowledge of the inaccuracy of the "list prices"
cited in the retailer-advertisements appears to be a defense
in price list cases,8' the Commission has held in Leeds,
which involved both preticketing and catalog insert sheets,
that it would look to only two factors: the generally pre-
vailing price in the area and the preticketed price. If they
are different, there is a violation of the FTC Act. 2 This
means that once a manufacturer pretickets his product he
may be at the mercy of market fluctuations.8 3  Thus the
79Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, supra note 76. "The Commission does
not contend that for the manufacturer to place tickets on its products before
delivering them to retailers indicating the retail purchase price, a practice
known as 'preticketing,' is illegal or deceptive per se. But the Commission
does maintain, and Baltimore agrees, that manufacturers who preticket their
products fictitiously are guilty of engaging in an unfair trade practice in
violation of the Act." Id. at 610.80 See, e.g., Rayex Corp., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 15823 (FTC April
2, 1962).
81 See note 67 spra.
8 2 Leeds Travelwear, Inc., 3 CCH TRADE REG. REP. 15997, at 20835 (FTC
July 20, 1962): "Where, as here [the amounts designated as 'retail' in the
catalog sheets] . . . are in excess of the generally prevailing retail prices, the
practice has a tendency or capacity to deceive. This is the test of legality
under Section 5. Knowledge on the part of respondents is not a material
consideration under these circumstances."
83 This is consistent with the provision of Guide VIII that "they [who
preticket] are chargeable with knowledge of the ordinary business 'facts of
life' concerning what happens to articles for which they furnished 'pre-
ticketed prices."' See note 39 supra and accompanying text. Quaere, how-
ever, whether the FTC would rigidly follow the Leeds standard where a
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national manufacturer honestly attempting to print the
"generally prevailing" price on his pretickets has little
chance of finding the magic figure at which all retailers
throughout the nation will sell his product. While there
might be no violation if only a few dealers cut this price,
there is clear warning that missing the mark by $2.00 in
thirty percent of the trade areas is a violation. 4 The fact
that the manufacturer's purpose may have been beyond re-
proach and that the preticket may have been followed in
seventy percent of the trade areas will be immaterial.
Supplying retailers with price lists involves many of
the same prediction problems as preticketing. A difference
between the two practices, however, is that the preticket
is clearly intended to be seen by the consumer, whereas,
at least arguably, the price list may only be intended to
assist the retailer in setting his resale price. This difference
has been suggested as the reason why Regina, a price list
case, requires proof that the manufacturer "knew or ought
to have known" that its list prices were fictitious, whereas
Leeds, a preticketing and catalog sheet case, holds that such
knowledge is immaterial in its circumstances. The Com-
mission's opinion in Regina, however, does not illuminate
this aspect of the problem.
Antitrust Implications
But even if the manufacturer makes an accurate future
prediction of the sale price of his product and pretickets
it or furnishes suggested list prices that all retailers there-
after follow, he faces the possible accusation of violating
another statutory antitrust provision. As Commissioner
Elman pointed out in Rayex:
Such conduct would not necessarily be immune from scrutiny
under other statutory provisions regulating business activity. For
example, it might in some circumstances suggest the existence of
precipitous market drop occurred after the manufacturer had distributed the
preticketed merchandise.
84 Baltimore Luggage Co. v. FTC, supra note 76.
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illegal anti-competitive pricing conditions in the industry. Com-
pare, e.g., United States v. Parke, Davis & Co., . . . 362 U.S.
29. . . . It may be, for example, that the industry in which the
practice is undertaken is characterized by price rigidity or uniform-
ity. That is to say, all dealers in a particular product may be
content to sell at the same price. If a manufacturer of such a
product pretickets it at what is in fact the uniform retail price
in the area, he is not engaging in false or misleading pricing.
Of course, rigidity and uniformity of price may make preticketing
even more suspect as a manifestation of some form of illegal
restraint of trade, but in such circumstances the practice is not
vulnerable as deceptive to consumers.85
This is a warning to manufacturers of another danger
awaiting them once the decision to preticket is made: they
may be accused of violating the Sherman Act and, con-
sequently, Section 5 of the FTC Act, by entering into an
illegal resale price maintenance agreement ith the con-
forming retailers." This danger is acute if the manufacturer
attempts to coerce recalcitrant retailers to sell at the pre-
ticketed or suggested price .
T
s8 Supra note 80, at 20627.
s6f BEt see Sidney J. Kreiss Inc., 56 F.T.C. 1421 (1960). Apparently ob-
livious of any vertical price-fixing problem, a differently-constituted Commis-
sion recited that a manufacturer "required" retailers to sell at prescribed
prices and "permitted" them to reduce these prices by half during special
sales.
87 1n United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919), the Supreme
Court decided that no Sherman Act offense was charged by an indictment
alleging only that a manufacturer specified resale prices to wholesalers and
retailers and told them he would refuse to deal with those who did not adhere
to such prices. "In the absence of any purpose to create or maintain a mo-
nopoly," the Court stated at 307, "he may announce in advance the circum-
stances under which he will refuse to sell." Subsequent decisions, however,
narrowly confined the Colgate doctrine. United States v. A. Schrader's Son,
252 U.S. 85 (1920); Frey & Son v. Cudahy Packing Co., 256 U.S. 208
(1921) ; FTC v. Beech-Nut Packing Co., 257 U.S. 441 (1922) ; United States
v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944) ; United States v. Parke,
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960). The Parke, Davis case involved a manu-
facturer who told wholesalers he would not deal with them if they supplied
retailers who cut prices below the manufacturer's suggested retail prices.
Because the wholesalers had acquiesced and withheld supplies from price-cutting
retailers, the manufacturer was found to have entered into an illegal com-
bination with them in violation of the Sherman Act. "When the manufac-
turer's actions . . . go beyond mere announcement of his policy and the
simple refusal to deal, and he employs other means which effect adherence to
his resale prices . . ." the Court said, "he has put together a combination in
violation of the Sherman Act." 362 U.S. at 44.
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But Klein v. American Luggage Works, Inc.,8 indicates
that conduct falling short of coercion may still be illegal.
There a manufacturer preticketed its luggage and announced
to its three retailer-customers in one trade area that it would
refuse to supply retailers who undercut the preticketed price
-a seemingly logical course for a manufacturer interested
in avoiding fictitious pricing problems. Yet, when the man-
ufacturer refused to sell to a price-cutting retailer, the
court held that the manufacturer and the two price-con-
forming retailers had violated the Sherman Act. 9
It is implicit in the Klein decision that, where a
manufacturer sets a retail price for a product, announcing
in advance that he will not supply retailers who sell below
that price, and some retailers accept the manufacturer's
goods, if the manufacturer acts on the prompting of those
retailers to refuse to sell to a price-cutter, he may be a
candidate for a price-fixing charge. 0
Thus the manufacturer who makes the decision to place
a preticket on his product or to suggest the retail price
for it sails henceforth in perilous waters. If he has mis-
judged the "going" price, a fictitious pricing charge may
be forthcoming; if some retailers actually sell at the pre-
ticketed price and, at their urging, he cuts off others who
do not, he is in peril of being charged with a Sherman Act
violation; if all retailers sell at the manufacturer's price,
even though no one complains, there may be a clear-cut
88 206 F. Supp. 924 (D. Del. 1962).
89 The court admitted there was no precedent in the authorities for this
part of the decision but reasoned that the two price-conforming retailers and
the manufacturer were co-conspirators by drawing analogies to Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939) and United States v.
Masonite Corp., 316 U.S. 265 (1942).
90 Quaere whether the Supreme Court, when and if it reviews the Klein
case, will find that American Luggage Co. used sufficient "other means" to
forfeit protection of the Colgate doctrine.
In holding the three defendants liable to the plaintiff the court paid
homage to the Colgate doctrine, but noted: "The conceptual difficulty which
inheres in this seemingly forthright line drawing process [of the Colgate
Doctrine] is the element of agreement which attends a seller's adherence to a
manufacturer's schedule of resale prices. In the face of an advance announce-
ment by the manufacturer that price-cutters will be denied supply, a seller's
compliance with prices suggested strongly infers a tacit or implied resale
price maintenance agreement." 206 F. Supp. at 937.
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Sherman Act violation. This may well cause the manu-
facturer to decide against any preticketing or price listing
at all.
CONCLUSION
Z. genuine bargain, something-for-nothing, is the utopian
dream of many consumers. Since the end of World War II,
sellers have fed the public appetite for bargains with a
growing variety of phony comparative-price sales appeals.
In the fierce competitive in-fighting for the consumer dollar,
fictitious pricing has become a common vice of the market
place.
The persistence of these schemes has generated stepped-
up regulatory efforts by the Federal Trade Commission.
In 1958, the Commission promulgated its Guides Against
Fictitious Pricing, which memorialized the considerable body
of Commission fictitious price rulings since 1914. The Com-
mission's more recent decisions have reinforced the Guides
and, in important cases, have gone beyond the Guides to
extend the businessman's periphery of hazard.
The standard of care which the Commission applies to
retail comparative price advertising has been drawn with
relative precision. Generally speaking, the higher price
(however described) against which the retailer lays his
"bargain" price must be truthfully told: it must either be
an actual immediately-precedent price of the advertiser or a
prevailing current price in the relevant trade area. The
Commission's test-ordained and largely inflexible-imposes
no unconscionable burden on the retailer. The Commission's
Guides and adjudicative rulings have defined the terms used
by the retailer and have fixed the retailer's responsibility
to predetermine the factual truth of his comparative claims.
While the retailer's road, however rough, is traversable,
the manufacturer who involves himself in the pricing process
through preticketing or list price suggestions runs a con-
siderably more perilous course. If a manufacturer pre-
tickets his product, he will run afoul of the Federal Trade
Commission Act wherever the retail price of the product
does not substantially conform to the ticketed price. Since
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preticketed merchandise almost inevitably emerges into com-
petitive markets where retail prices may be highly volatile,
it is incumbent upon the manufacturer to ascertain that the
ticketed price is actually the price at which the retailers are
selling the product to consumers. Short of an automated
ticketing program, instantly responsive to shifting market
trends, the preticketing manufacturer avoids involvement
in deception at the risk of conduct courting antitrust
involvement.
The perils of list price suggestion may be even more
severe. While the Regina doctrine is not yet secure, its
gloomy premonitions can already be felt. At the very least,
a manufacturer is implicated where he has knowledge that
his suggested list prices are in excess of prevailing retail
prices (and hence "fictitious") ; at the most, he may be
vulnerable, with or without knowledge, whenever his list
prices, in fact, exceed retail prices. Here, too, the manu-
facturer assures against deception, reinforces truth, only at
a risk of antitrust offense through efforts to stabilize retail
prices.
The Federal Trade Commission has raised storm signals
in clear view of the businessman determined to use pre-
tickets or suggested list prices. He must now frankly ap-
praise the hazards of such activities in the light of the
Commission's newly sensitized alertness to possible de-
ception. At the same time, he must avoid the antitrust
implications of too-scrupulous retailer adherence to his
ticketed or suggested list prices. In the glare of official
scrutiny, ordinary prudence may require extraordinary care.
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